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tweet,	 which	 was	 immediately	 followed	 by	 national	 moral	 outrage.	
Later,	when	 justifying	 the	 department’s	 choice	 of	words,	 the	 police	
chief	claimed	that	“[i]t	is	undeniable	that	there	is	an	accumulation	of	
criminal	acts	by	persons	from	North	African	areas,	and	we	needed	to	






trait	in virtue of some North-African “nature”. It	is	as	if	‘nafri’	says:	“there 
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2.	 The	 original	 German	 tweet	 reads:	 “#PolizeiNRW	 #Silvester2016	 #Sicher-
InKöln:	 Am	HBF	werden	 derzeit	mehrere	Hundert	Nafris	 überprüft.	 Infos	
folgen”.	 Cf.	 http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/silvester-kontrollen-in-
koeln-was-bitteschoen-ist-ein-nafri-a-1128172.html,	downloaded	01.01.2017.
3.	 German	 original:	 “Eine	 Häufung	 an	 Straftaten	 von	 Personen	 aus	 dem	
nordafrikanischen	Raum	 lasse	 sich	aber	nicht	bestreiten,	und	dafür	müsse	
dann	 polizeiintern	 auch	 ein	 Begriff	 gefunden	 werden”	 (http://www.zeit.
de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-01/koeln-silvesternacht-polizei-nafri-
tweet-racial-profiling,	downloaded	01.01.2017).























which	 (nearly)	 all	 members	 of	 the	 class	 of	 its	 paradig-
matic	samples	are	instances.	Substances	are	explanatory	




upon	 introduction	 of	 the	 kind	 term,	 the	 reference	 of	 slur	 terms	 will	 still	
be	empty,	but	 the	alleged	referents	will	 still	be	presupposed	 to	possess	an	
“essence”	with	negative	causal-dispositional	potential.	
6.	 Throughout	the	paper,	I	do not use	‘designate’,	‘refer’,	and	cognate	expressions	











that	slurs4	are	a	species	of	 failed kind terms;	 they	are	 terms	which,	al-
though	introduced	with	the	intention	of	designating	kinds,	fail	to	do	
















the	 class	 of	 slurs,	 and,	 relatedly,	 how	 to	 distinguish	 slurs	 from	other	 pejo-
ratives	(see,	e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Bach,	2018;	Croom,	2011;	 Jesh-
ion,	2013a;	Popa-Wyatt,	2016).	My	answer	to	this	question	has	direct	conse-

























constitute	 a	 theory-like	 representation	 encoded	 in	 those	 concepts.8 
The	central	 element	of	 a	 slur	 is	 the	 causal	 component:	 the	 intrinsic	










have	 to	 be	 known	what	 exactly	 the	 essence	 is. Rather,	 essentialism	
can	be	 thought	of	 as	 “a	 ‘placeholder’	notion:	one	can	believe	 that	a	
8.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 paper,	 I	 often	 use	 the	 terms	 ‘term’	 and	 ‘concept’	
interchangeably.	This	is	because	I	take	the	view	for	granted	according	to	which	
terms	 inherit	 their	 linguistic	meaning	directly	 from	 internally	 individuated	
lexical	concepts,	which	I	understand	as	the	smallest	constituents	of	thought	
and	primary	bearers	of	meaning.
constitution,	 which	 in	 turn	 explains	 their	 most	 salient	
characteristics	—	in	 the	 case	 of	 water	 samples,	 the	 fact	







‘Water’	 hence,	 designates	 whatever underlying	 physical	 characteris-














that	 some	 stereotypes	 associated	 with	 a	 slur	 change.	 For	 example,	 at	 the	
time	of	introduction	of	‘faggot’,	the	“gayness	essence”	wasn’t	taken	to	explain	
the	feature	of	carrying	HIV,	a	negative	stereotypical	feature	now	associated	
with	 the	 slur,	 since	 the	 slur	 predates	 the	 discovery	 of	 the	 virus.	 In	 these	
cases,	we	simply	discover	more features	to	be	caused	by	the	essence	(just	as	
with	other	natural	kind	terms),	and	update	the	concept	accordingly.	Insofar	
as	the	updated	concept	 is	sufficiently	similar,	concept	 identity	 is	preserved	
(see	section	1.3).	Note,	however,	that	the	focus	of	this	paper	is	on	lexical,	not	
diachronic,	 semantics.	Diachronic	 phenomena,	 such	 as	 acquisition,	 lexical	
transition	from	non-slurring	to	slurring	meaning,	meaning	identity	over	time,	
or	appropriation	have	to	be	addressed	in	a	separate	paper.















The	 immensely	 derogatory,	 toxic	 power	 of	 slur	 terms	 and	 their	
distinctively	racist (or	xenophobic,	homophobic,	sexist,	etc.)	content	
directly	derives	 from	 the	outlined	semantics.	When	 the	 racist,	 xeno-
phobe,	or	homophobe	applies	a	slur,	he	thereby	makes	the	target	in	


















































be	positive.	However,	 I	do	not	 think	 this	 is	 correct.	We	often	use	negative	
properties	 of	 others	 to	 our	 favor,	 as	 in:	 “I’m	 in	 love	with	 this	woman,	 but	
she	has	a	husband.	I	wish	I	knew	some	criminal,	bad	person	who	could	help	









1.2 Some Helpful Contrasts
One	of	 the	most	 important	 things	 to	emphasize	 is	 that	on	my	view,	
slur	terms	are	not synonymous	with	their	neutral	counterparts.	In	fact,	















not identical to the	 essence	 of	 ‘Chinese’.	 Also	 under	 the	 assumption	


















from	 cognitive	 and	 developmental	 psychology	 that	 young	 children	
think	 that	 kangaroos	 that	 grow	 up	 with	 goats	 will	 nevertheless	 be	
good	at	hopping.	We	act	as	if	kangaroos	are	just made to	hop	(Gelman,	
2004;	Gelman	&	Wellman,	 1991).	So	 just	as	a	kangaroo	cannot	 lose	
its	 “kangaroohood”	 if	 it	 is	 raised	 in	a	goat	 family,	and	 is	disposition-
ally	“made”	to	hop	even	if	 it	doesn’t	do	so	(cf.	 for	an	empirical	over-
view	Gelman,	2003;	2004),	so	are	the	members	of	the	social	groups	















elements	play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 ensuring	 that	 slurs	will	 come	out	 as	
empty,	as	there	is	and	will	be	no	“deep	essence”	that	explains	features	
associated	with	a	group,	even if the stereotypes, due to effects of structural 

















or	 conceptual	 content	 of	 slurs”	 (Croom,	 2015,	 p.	 35).	 Although	 properties	
corresponding	 to	 the	 neutral	 counterpart	 will	 often	 have	 high	 inductive	
weight	and	thereby	explain	the	relationship	between	slurs	and	paradigmatic	












degrees	of	 causal	 innocence	 than	 the	 linguistic	 conventions	govern-
ing	slur	terms.	This	means	that	it	 is	not necessary	 in	order	to	be	com-















conditionally	 equivalent.	Although	my	 account,	 like	Croom’s,	 treats	
slurs	as	 informationally	rich,	 there	are	a	number	of	 important	differ-
ences	between	them.	Under	my	account,	slurs	do	not	merely	encode	










convention	governing	 slurs	does not leave open	 the	possibility	 of	 a	 causally-
neutral	application.


























in	 another	 paper	 discussing	 the	 general viability	 of	 this	 approach	 to	
meaning	and	concepts.	











speech-act	 to	 explain	 the	 semantics	 of	 slurs.	 As	 the	 pure	 truth-con-
ditional	attribution	of	neutral	counterpart	group	membership	doesn’t	












speaker’s	 social,	 psychological,	 and/or	 emotional	 relation	 to	 that	 se-
mantic	value”	(Camp,	2013,	p.	335);	thus,	slurs	contribute	“a (broadly) 
expressive, perspectival element to the conversation”	(my	emphasis;	Camp,	
2018,	p.	48).	The	latter	quote	is	instructive:	The	second	speech-act	is	
broadly	expressive,	because	it	is	about the	speaker’s	perspective	on	a	






17.	 Another	difference	 is	 that	Camp	explicitly	 rejects	 that	slurs,	generally,	 con-
ventionally	 encode	 stereotypes.	However,	 because	 she	 suspects	 that	 some	
slurs	do	encode	stereotypes,	I	will	treat	this	difference	as	not	too	important	
(see	Camp,	2013).






in	 (1)	 has	 to	do	quite	 some	work	 and	 introduce	 a	 variety	of	 qualifi-
cations	 to	get	 their	 intended,	minimal	meaning	of	 ‘queer’	across.	Al-
though	 the	 speaker	 rejects	 many	 stereotypes,	 one	 surface	 property	













this	 data	 point.	 I,	 for	 one,	 have	 extreme	 difficulties	 making	 sense	 of	 (1),	
especially	if	schematically	replaced	with	other	slurs.	Here’s	one	reason	that	









on	 finding	 others	 ‘different’—often	 because	 of	 physical	 characteristics”	 (p.	
322).	+different	or	+physical	characteristic	c,	however,	are	stereotypical	





convincing	replies	 to	 the	first	worry	 (see,	e.g.,	Chomsky,	2000;	Har-
man,	1993;	Marconi,	1997;	Smith,	Medin,	&	Rips,	1984).	Their	strategy	
emphasizes	 that,	holding	 the	 level	of	 competence	fixed,	similarity of 
conceptual content	is	all	we	need	to	explain	the	stability	of	meaning	be-
tween	different	speakers,	and,	for	that	matter,	communicative	success.	





en	 term	 in	borderline	cases.	 If	 the	meaning	of	every	word	 type	was	
strictly	identical	between	each	competent	speaker,	these	phenomena	
would	become	a	mystery.	Thus,	modeling	meaning	stability	in	terms	











way	of	 thinking	about	queers.	 I	have	no	 idea	who	does	
19.	 This	point	is	quite	important	and	often	neglected	in	discussions	of	conceptions	
of	meaning	that	appeal	to	stereotypes.	It	belongs	to	the	operationalization	of	
a	stereotype	that	it is highly stable:	Something	is	a	stereotype	only if it is highly 
stable	 in	a	population.	 If	 there	was	no	cross-subject	stability,	we	would	not	
call	a	given	property	a	 stereotype.	Relatedly,	 if	 stereotypes	allowed	 for	high	
variability,	we	would	not	get	reliable	and	replicable	effects	in	experimental	
paradigms	 and	 hence	 wouldn’t	 be	 able	 to	 find	 any	 stereotype	 effects	 in	
controlled	 settings—but	 we	 do.	 Also	 detrimental	 phenomena	 such	 as	 the	
stereotype	threat	would	not	be	very	worrisome	if	the	associations	triggered	
were	as	variable	across	subjects	as	is	suggested	by	the	objection.




§2: Slurs in Natural Language 
Having	 presented	 the	 view,	 I	 will	 now	 demonstrate	 its	 explanatory	
reach.	 Slurs	 exhibit	 unique	 linguistic	 patterns	 that	 have	 proven	 dif-
ficult	to	capture.	However,	since	these	data	are	acknowledged	as	ex-
planatorily	 central	 for	 a	 successful	 theory	of	 slurs,	 any	 adequate	 ac-
count	must	have	the	resources	to	explain	them.	The	data	include:	(1)	




















































hibits	 other	 stereotypes	 that	 license	 inference	 to	 the	 essence.	 Since	
the	 speaker	also	knows	 that	 there	are	 “experts”	of	 the	 term	 in	 their	

























Jeshion	 (2013a)	 dubs	 cases	 such	 as	 the	 ones	 in	 (2)	 and	 (3)	—	in	
which	the	slur	is	applied	to	a	target	that	doesn’t	belong	to	the	group	
paradigmatically	 associated	 with	 the	 slur	—	“G-extending”	 uses	 of	
slurs.24	Some	 theorists	have	 tried	 to	explain	away	G-extending	uses	
by	stipulating	that	they	are	non-literal	(e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	
Jeshion,	2013a);	therefore,	a	theory	of	slurs	need	not	account	for	these	
uses.	However,	none	of	 these	 theorists	has	offered	an	argument that 






er,	 if	 ‘gay	man’	and	 ‘faggot’	were truth-conditionally	equivalent,	as	 is	
defended	in	many	prominent	accounts	on	slurs,	(2)	should	express	a	
semantic	contradiction	that	can	only	be	“rescued”	pragmatically.	For	






tory	 properties	 of	 slurs	 (Jeshion,	 2013a).	 And	 as	we	 saw	 earlier,	 ac-
cording	to	Camp,	one	of	the	speech-acts	slur	users	engage	in	is	a	pure	





















of	 the	 neutral	 counterpart	 into	 the	 truth-conditional	meaning	 of	 a	 slur,	 or	
treat	slurs	and	neutral	counterparts	as	truth-conditionally	equivalent	(condi-
tional	on	the	existence	on	a	neutral	counterpart	term—see	Nunberg,	2018).






(6b).	 In	(6b),	which	parallels	(6a),	what	the	speaker	 is	 literally	accus-
ing	me	of	and	is	thus	accountable	for	is	being,	deep	down,	a	liar.	To	




is.	 The	 intended	meanings	 of	 (4)–(6)	 are	 furthermore	 directly	 avail-








































(6)	 a.	 “I	 know	 that	 he’s	 not	 gay,	 but	 deep	 down,	 he’s	 a	
faggot.”


























racist	 or	 homophobe,	 just	 are	 the	 paradigmatic	 instantiators	 of	 fea-
tures	that	indicate	the	presence	of	the	relevant	essence.	In	most	cases,	










(4) Non-derogatory, Non-appropriated Uses of Slurs
Another	species	of	slur	that	is	often	considered	problematic	in	the	lit-
erature	are	non-derogatory	examples	of	slur	uses,	sometimes	termed	





truth-conditionally	 equivalent.30	 Since	 slurs	 and	 their	 neutral	 coun-
terparts	are	truth-conditionally	equivalent,	it	is	not	possible	to	apply	
the	neutral	counterpart	term	to	someone	while	denying	that	the	target	




homosexual	preferences	 to	him.	This	 is	 the	case	 if	 the	object	of	 the	
discourse,	 in	 the	eyes	of	 the	slur	user,	does	not	exhibit	sufficient sur-
face	features	that	would	license	the	inductive	inference	to	the	“gayness	
essence”.	And	 this	fits	 the	 intuition	 for	 (8):	While	 the	person	under	
discussion	has	homosexual	preferences,	we	take	the	sentence	to	mean	
that	he	will	lack	many	features	associated	with	a	“gay	nature”.	
(3) G-referencing Uses of Slurs




30.	As	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 advocates	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 slurs	 and	 their	
neutral	 counterparts	 are	 truth-conditionally	 equivalent	 can	 resort	 to	 the	
claim	 that	 the	slur	uses	 in	 (7)–(9)	are	non-literal.	Again,	 I	don’t	 claim	 that	










terpart	sentences,	 since	⟦slur⟧ = ⟦counterpart⟧.	This	prediction	hasn’t	been	
made	explicit	in	the	literature	to	my	knowledge,	but	strikes	me	as	worrisome.
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(5) Null-extension 
We	have	 seen	 that	 an	 (empirical)	 consequence	of	my	 framework	 is	
that	most	slurs	—	importantly,	the	ones	we	regard	as	particularly	tox-




as	a	 “Latino	essence”	 that	dispositionally	causes	Latin	Americans	 to	
harass	women	or	work	in	the	service	industry.	There	is	no	such	thing	




























(14)	 “Institutions	 that	 treat	Chinese	as	Chinese	are	mor-
ally	depraved.”
But	intuitively,	many	speakers	would	assign	truth	to	(13)	while	reject-
ing	 (14).	 In	addition,	many	expressivist	 accounts	predict	 that	 (13)	 is	
derogatory,	 since	 each	 assertion	 of	 a	 proposition	 containing	 a	 slur	
is	 an	 expression	 of	 contempt.	 However,	 according	 to	 some	 theo-
















Alternatively,	 the	slur	might	 trigger	an	existential	presupposition	such	 that	



















a	 number	 of	 features	 associated	 with	 the	 slur,	 which,	 according	 to	
Croom,	include	features	such	as	“x	is	a	Mexican-American”	or	“x	is	a	
foreign	worker	or	 exchange	 student	with	 a	 thick	non-native	 accent”	
(Croom,	2014b,	p.	162).	The	essentialist	account	differs	from	Croom’s	
insofar	as	what	 is	decisive	 for	 the	successful	 reference	of	 the	slur	 is	

































obtains	 by	 virtue	 of	 something	 specifically about the sub-

















set	 of	 negatively-valenced	weighted	 features.	 If	 a	 person	 P	 satisfies	













Importantly,	 although	 slurs	 have	 null-extension,	 uses	 of	 slurs	 still	




such	 as	 negations,	 conditionals,	modals,	 or	 questions	 (Anderson	&	































A	 standard	 position	 in	 formal	 semantics	 is	 that	we	 should	 intro-
duce	an	existential	domain	condition	(in	other	words,	a	lexical existen-
















Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 last	 explanandum	 on	 our	 list.	 It	 is	 widely	
thought	that	some	pejoratives	are	more	powerful	in	their	disparaging	




‘limey’	—	the	former	 is	substantially	stronger	 in	 its	derogatory	effects	
than	the	latter.	The	same	goes	for	 ‘chink’	vs.	 ‘kraut’,	 ‘kike’	vs.	 ‘honky’,	
‘wog’	vs.	‘yank’,	and	so	on.40	Furthermore,	the	derogatory	content	of	a	
slur	can	vary	as	a	function	of	time:	The	derogatory	force	of	‘kraut’	or	



















some	 of	 the	 social	 groups	 referenced	 in	 this	 paper,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Bessenoff	&	
Sherman	(2000);	Copping	et	al.	(2013);	Cvencek,	Meltzoff,	and	Greenwald	
Take,	as	an	example,	(24).	Although	the	speaker	does	not attribute	a	
“Jewish	 essence”	 to	 the	 object	 of	 discourse,	 (24)	 clearly	 stays	 an	 in-
stance	of	derogatory	slur	usage.	Why?









ver,	 lemonade,	 or	 English	 professors.	Analogously,	 utterance	 of	 any	
sentence	in	(24)–(27)	is	only	felicitous	if	the	speaker	presupposes	that	
there	are	objects	in	our	domain	the	slurs	apply	to.	But	presupposing,	





a	causally	potent	essence	 to	a	discourse	object.	And	since	 in	 reality,	
38.	Note	that	we	can	successfully	apply	the	well-known	“wait	a	minute”	test	to	





















it	explains	 the	data.	 I	maintain	 that	 the	derogatory	 force	of	a	slur	 is	






















47.	 These	 comparisons	 are	 not	 completely	 clean—it	 proves	 hard	 to	 keep	 the	
essentialist	 or	 stereotype	 dimensions	 fixed	 when	 making	 comparisons.	 It	
is	 very	plausible,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 social	 category	of	 communists	was	
more	essentialized	during	the	Cold	War	than	it	 is	now.	Similarly,	although	
“race”	 receives	 generally	 the	 highest	 essentialism	 ratings,	 essentialism	 for	




their	 amusement.	 These	 teenagers	 are	 complete	 strangers,	 and	 you	
will	 never	 see	 them	again.	You	 know	 that	whether	 these	 teenagers	
think	well	of	you	or	not	has	no	impact	whatsoever	on	anything	you	
take	to	matter	 in	your	 life.	Still,	 their	snicker	hurts.43	Naturally,	 then,	
stronger	negative	attitudes	will	hurt	more,	and	weaker	negative	atti-
tudes	will	hurt	less.









are,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 users,	 associated	with	 highly	 nega-
tive	stereotypes.	Theories	 that	 solely	 rely	on	differences	 in	negative	
attitudes	or	descriptive	information	can’t	account	for	this	fine-grained	
pattern	of	the	data.
The	essentialist	 theory	captures	 this	 subtle	pattern.	The	slurs	we	
find	particularly	 toxic	—	the	ones	 targeting	 someone	on	 the	basis	of	
(2011);	Cvencek	et	al.	(2015);	Devine	(1989);	Dovidio,	Evans,	and	Tyler	(1986);	
Eberhardt	et	al.	(2004);	Gaertner	and	McLaughlin	(1983);	Goff	et	al.	(2008);	














commodate	 the	 theoretical	 difficulty	 of	 finding	 a	 clear	 demarcating	
criterion	 distinguishing	 slurs	 from	 non-slurs.	 Many	 theorists	 draw	
a	distinction	between	slurs,	which	 target	 individuals	based	on	 their	
membership	 in	 a	group,	 and	 individual	pejoratives,	which	 target	 in-
dividuals	based	on	some	(temporary)	behavior	or	“personal	qualities”.	
While	everyone	can	point	at	paradigmatic	examples	of	slurs,	and	par-
adigmatic	 cases	of	 individual	pejoratives	 (‘jerk’,	 ‘asshole’,	 ‘dickhead’),	















distinguishing	slurs	 from	 individual	pejoratives.	 Just	as	essentialism	
ratings	are	on	a	continuum,	our	judgements	about	whether	something	
is	a	slur	or	not	will	be	on	a	continuum,	rather	than	an	all-or-nothing	
affair.	 People	 are	 less	 sure	 about	whether	 people	with	 higher	 body	
weight	or	communist	attitudes	are	describable	by	having	some	“group	











of	 naturalness,	 stability,	 discreteness	 of	 category	 boundaries,	 immu-
tability	of	category	membership,	and	necessity	of	category	features.48 
Within	the	40	social	categories	that	were	rated,49	the	categories	of	gen-
















49.	 The	aim	of	 the	 study	was	 to	 cover	as	many	categories	as	possible;	 among	
many	others,	some	of	the	assessed	categories	were,	e.g.,	diseases	(AIDS	pa-
tients,	cancer	patients),	dietary	groups	(meat	eaters,	vegetarians),	intelligence	













lished	 psychological	 paradigms,	 cognitive	 psychologists	 have	 docu-





as	we	have	 already	 seen	 in	 the	 last	 section,	we	now	know	 that	we	
also	think	of	many	human	or	social categories in	this	exact	same,	highly	
essentialized,	way.51	More	 concretely,	we	behave	 as	 if	 social	 groups	







51.	 There	 is	wide-ranging	evidence	that	we	hold	essentialist	beliefs	 from	early	
childhood	on,	which	has	been	documented	by	psychologists—prominently,	


















essence”	 that	determines	 their	behavior,	 traits,	 and	unifies	 them,	or	
whether	 they	 should	be	characterized	 simply	as	having	mutable,	 in-
dividual	properties.	Hence,	 in	 these	cases,	subjects	will	be	reluctant,	
unsure,	or	 in	disagreement	about	whether	 to	call	a	 term	 ‘slur’	or	an	
‘individual	pejorative’,	just	as	predicted	by	the	essentialist	theory.	
In	 sum,	 theories	 that	 appeal	 to	 differences	 between	 descriptive	











§3 Slurs and the Psychology of Social Kinds
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psychologists	 for	 the	past	30	years.	 If	we	take	these	findings	at	 face	
value,	we	must,	 in	 any	 case,	 accept	 that	many	 social	 concepts	have	
an	essentialist	structure.	Accordingly,	 to	assume	that	also	slur	terms	
are	associated	with	essentialistically	 structured	 concepts	 is	not	only	
descriptively	plausible	but	also	theoretically	parsimonious.
Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 second	 key	 component	 of	my	 semantics,	
namely,	 that	 slurs	encode	negatively	valenced	 stereotypes.	Recently,	
the	 phenomenon	 of	 slurring	 language	 has	 begun	 to	 be	 empirically	
investigated	by	psycholinguists.	These	studies	revealed	that	slurs,	in	









more	 negatively-valenced	 than	 when	 presented	 with	 their	 neutral	
counterparts.	However,	 since	 this	 experiment	 used	 an	 explicit	 para-
digm,	we	cannot	make	strong	inferences	about	the	semantic	structure	
of	slurs	on	the	basis	of	it.56	For	this	reason,	in	a	follow	up	study,	Carnaghi	
55.	 There	 are	many	ways	 to	 carve	up	 the	 semantics-pragmatics	 distinction.	 In	
this	 paper,	 I	 assume	 the	 psychology-based	 framework	 according	 to	which	
semantics	 includes	 those	representations	 that	enter	 into	and	are	 the	result	
of	 immediate	 composition	 by	 our	 linguistic	 competence,	 and	 pragmatics	
includes	 all	 post-compositional	 representations	 that	 have	 been	 subject	 to	
general	reasoning	processing	from	central	cognition.
56.	The	most	 important	 limitation	of	 explicit	 tasks	 is	 that	 they	do	not	 impose	
any	constraints	controlling	for	response	modifications	by	conscious	reason-
ing	 and	 voluntary	 control.	 For	 example,	 the	 negative	 association	 could	 as	
well	be	a	post-semantic,	pragmatic-inferential	phenomenon	and	would	thus	
not	 constitute	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 stereotypes	 are	 se-















documented	essentialist	 thinking	about	 race	 in	both	adults	and	pre-






the	 same	 preference	 for	 race	 as	 the	 dominant	 factor	 compared	 to	
other	 physical	 features	 for	 inheritance	 judgements:	When	 children	
were	 asked	which	 properties	 they	would	 inherit	 from	 their	 parents,	





To	 sum	 up,	 reasoning	 about	 social	 categories	 follows	 typical	 es-
sentialist	dimensions	already	in	early	childhood.	Thus,	my	proposed	
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which	confirms,	experimentally,	that	there	is	a	major	semantic	differ-









We	 saw	 in	 the	 last	 section	 that	my	view	explains	 the	 central	 lin-
guistic	 data	 involving	 slurs,	 and	 I	 have	 now	 shown	 that	 it	 receives	





view	 that	 social	 concepts	 have	 essentialist	 structure,	 and	 is	 directly	
supported	by	experimental	research	on	slurring	words.
3.2 Nomen est Omen: The Important Role of Nouns 
If	 you	 go	 through	 a	 mental	 list	 of	 the	 slurs	 that	 you	 are	 familiar	
with,	you	will	probably	notice	 that	all	of	 them	belong	 to	 the	syntac-
tic	category	of	nouns.	This	 is	peculiar,	given	 that	most	of	slurs’	neu-























targets,	 regardless of	 whether	 the	 prime	was	 neutral	 or	 derogatory.	
This	means	that	both	neutral	and	derogatory	category	representations	















1988),	 supports	 that	 typicality	 effects	 are	 robust	 and	 thus	 relatively	 stable	
among	subjects.	Even	critics	of	prototype	theory	often	describe	this	stability	
as	the	most	attractive	feature	of	prototype	theory	(Fodor,	1998).












potential	 children	 infer	 from	noun	and	verb	 labels	 (Gelman	&	Hey-
man,	 1999).	They	either	heard	a	 story	 that	contained	 “a	carrot	eater”	
(noun	phrase;	NP),	or	a	 story	 that	 talked	about	 someone	who	 “eats	
carrots	whenever	she	can”	(verb	phrase;	VP).	In	the	critical	part,	the	










initiated	 by	 Gelman	 and	 Heyman.	 In	 multiple	 experiments	 testing	




val	 description.	 Remarkably,	 nouns	 also	 inhibit	 inferences	 about	 be-
haviors	 or	 habits	 that	 are	 associatively	 rather	 incongruent	with	 the	
descriptors.	 For	 example,	 a	 person	 that	 is	 homosexual	 (adjective)	
was	 estimated	 to	 attend	 the	 church	more	 often	 than	 a	 homosexual	
(noun).	Moreover,	nouns	but	not	adjectives	inhibit the	possibility	of	




Wierzbicka	 (1986),	 consider	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 sentences	
“Anna	is	blond”	and	“Anna	is	a	blonde”.	In	both	cases,	we	predicate	a	


























an	enduring,	 stable	 state	 that	 is	 central	 to	 the	person’s	 identity	 and	
reliably	causes	a	number	of	other	properties	of	 the	person	(Gelman,	





This	paper	was	an	attempt	 to	contribute	 to	 the	task	assigned	so	poi-
gnantly	by	Baldwin,	and	come	a	step	closer	to	an	answer	to	his	ques-
tion.	 I	have	argued	 that	 the	central	mechanism	of	 slurs	 is	one	of	es-
sentialization;	 slurs	are	akin	 to	kind	 terms	 that	denote	an	essence	of	
a	 social	 category	which	nomologically	 connects	 to	a	 set	of	negative	
stereotypical	features.	In	effect,	by	using	slurs,	or	even	having	them	in	
our	public	lexicon,	we	commit	to	a	way	of	carving	up	the	social	world	


















59.	Raoul	Peck’s	documentary	film	I Am Not Your Negro	is	a	collage	based	on	the	
unfinished	manuscripts	of	Remember this House,	immersed	with interview	ex-
cerpts	by	Baldwin	and	a	variety	of	other	material	(Peck,	2016).	The	final	scene	





















that	nouns	are	 the	main	 syntactic	 vehicle	of	 slurs.	According	 to	my	
theory,	slurs	encode	essentialist	information.	We	have	now	seen	that	










the	first	place.	Because	 I	am	not	a	nigger.	 I’m	a	man.	 If	
I’m	not	the	nigger	here,	and	if	you	invented	him,	you	the	
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